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ABSTRACT
Tardos codes are currently the state-of-the-art in the de-
sign of practical collusion-resistant fingerprinting codes. Tar-
dos codes rely on a secret vector drawn from a publicly known
probability distribution in order to generate each Buyer’s fin-
gerprint. For security purposes, this secret vector must not be
revealed to the Buyers. To prevent an untrustworthy Provider
forging a copy of a Work with an innocent Buyer’s finger-
print, previous asymmetric fingerprinting algorithms enforce
the idea of the Buyers generating their own fingerprint. Ap-
plying this concept to Tardos codes is challenging since the
fingerprint must be based on this vector secret.
This paper provides the first solution for an asymmetric
fingerprinting protocol dedicated to Tardos codes. The moti-
vations come from a new attack, in which an untrustworthy
Provider by modifying his secret vector frames an innocent
Buyer.
Index Terms— Asymmetric fingerprinting, Tardos code
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a problem arising in the fingerprinting of
digital content. In this context, a fingerprint is a binary code
that is inserted into the Work for the purpose of protecting it
from unauthorized use, or, more precisely, for the purpose of
identifying individuals responsible for unauthorized use of a
Work. In such a scenario, it is assumed that two or more users
may collude in order to try to hide their identities. In this
case, it is further assumed that colluders cannot alter those
bits of the code that are identical for all colluders. However,
where bits differ across colluders, these bits may be assigned
arbitrary values. A key problem is resistance to collusion, i.e.
if a coalition of c users creates a pirated copy of the Work, its
tampered fingerprint (i) should not implicate innocent users,
and (ii) should identify at least one of the colluders.
This problem has received considerable attention since
Boneh and Shaw [1] discussed the problem. They first in-
troduced the concept of totally c-secure codes: if a coalition
of c users colludes to produce a pirate copy of the Work,
the tampered fingerprint is still guaranteed to identify at least
one of the colluders, with no chance of framing an innocent.
Boneh and Shaw showed that totally c-secure binary codes
do not exist for c > 1. They then introduced the concept
of a c-secure code such that the probability of framing an
innocent is lower than ǫ. Unfortunately, the length of their
codes, O(c4 log(nǫ ) log(
1
ǫ )), where n is the number of users,
was such as to make them impractical. Following Boneh and
Shaw’s paper, there has been considerable effort to design
shorter codes.
In 2003, Tardos [2] proposed an efficient code construc-
tion that, for the first time, reduced the code length to the
lower bound, O(c2 log(nǫ )), thereby making such codes
practical. Tardos codes are currently the state-of-the-art for
collusion-resistant fingerprinting.
Several papers have considered a scenario where the
Provider is untrustworthy. Thanks to the knowledge of a
Buyer’s fingerprint, the Provider creates a pirated copy of
a Work, implicating this innocent Buyer. To prevent this,
Pfitzman [3] first introduced the concept of asymmetric fin-
gerprinting in which the Provider doesn’t need to know the
Buyer’s fingerprint. The Buyer first commits to a secret (the
fingerprint) that only he/she knows. The Buyer and Provider
then follow a protocol which results in the Buyer receiving
a copy of the Work with his/her secret fingerprint (and some
additional information coming from the Provider) embedded
within it. The Provider did not learn the Buyer’s secret, and
cannot therefore create a forgery. Unfortunately, in the case
of Tardos codes, fingerprints must be drawn from a particular
probability distribution depending on a secret vector only
known to the Provider. Thus, previous asymmetric finger-
printing methods cannot be applied to Tardos codes.
The Tardos decoding is also vulnerable to an additional
attack, in which the Provider does not need to create a forgery.
Rather, given any unauthorized copy, i.e. a Work that does
not contain the innocent Buyer’s fingerprint, the Provider can
alter its secret vector in order to accuse an arbitrary Buyer.
Our paper is organized as follows. We briefly introduce
Tardos codes in Sec. 2. Sec. 3 describes the attack at the
decoding side. In order to prevent both the Buyer and the
Provider from cheating, Sec. 4 presents a new asymmetric
protocol specific to Tardos codes. Sec. 5 then discusses practi-
cal aspects of the fingerprints embedding and accusation. We
finally discuss our solution in Sec. 6 before concluding.
2. THE TARDOS FINGERPRINTING CODE
For readers unfamiliar with Tardos codes, we now provide a
brief introduction. Further details can be found in [4].
Let n denote the number of buyers, and m the length of
the code. The fingerprints can then be arranged as a binary
n×mmatrixX, Buyer j being related to the binary fingeprint
Xj = (Xj1, Xj2, . . . , Xjm).
To generate this matrix, m real numbers pi ∈ [t, 1 − t]
are generated, each of them being randomly and indepen-
dently drawn according to the probability density function
f : [t, 1 − t] → R+ with f(z) = κ(t)(z(1 − z))−1/2 and
κ(t)−1 =
∫ 1−t
t (z(1 − z))
−1/2dz. The parameter t ≪ 1 is
referred to as the cutoff. We set p = (p1, . . . , pm). This vec-
tor p is the secret key of the code only known by the Provider.
Each element of the matrix X is then independently randomly
drawn, such that the probability that an element, Xji, in the
matrix is a one is given by P(Xji = 1) = pi. The fingerprint
is then embedded into the copy of the Work of the correspond-
ing Buyer thanks to a watermarking technique.
If an unauthorized copy is found, its corresponding finger-
print, Y, is decoded. Due to collusion, and possible distor-
tions such as transcoding, the decoded fingerprint is unlikely
to exactly equal one of the fingerprints in the matrix, X. To
determine if Buyer j is involved in the production of the unau-
thorized copy, a score, referred to as an accusation score, Sj
is computed. If this score is greater than a given threshold Z ,
then Buyer j is considered to have colluded.
The scores are computed according to an accusation func-
tion g, reflecting the impact of the correlation between the
sequence Xj , associated with Buyer j, and the decoded se-
quence Y:
Sj = G(Y,Xj ,p) =
m∑
i=1
g(Yi, Xji, pi). (1)
In the usual symmetric codes [4], function g is constrained
(such that, for example, for an innocent, the expectation of
the score is zero and its variance is m), giving g(1, 1, p) =
g(0, 0, 1− p) = −g(0, 1, p) = −g(1, 0, 1− p) =
√
1−p
p .
3. UNTRUSTWORTHY CONTENT PROVIDER
We now consider the case where the Provider is no longer
trusted, and, as such, wishes to frame Buyer j. In such a sce-
nario, we assume that the Provider has no prior access to an
unauthorized copy, i.e. the Provider cannot insert a false fin-
gerprint into the unauthorized copy, nor can he/she place a
Buyer’s copy on an unauthorized location. On receipt of an
unauthorized copy, we further assume that the untrustworthy
Provider to extracts the corresponding fingerprint present in
the unauthorized copy. We base this assumption on the hy-
pothesis that the underlying watermarking algorithm comes
from a technology provider and that the Provider doesn’t mas-
ter or has no access to this technology brick. Given the ex-
tracted fingerprint Y, the Provider must now compare it to all
known Buyers’ fingerprints. This comparison is performed
using Eq. (1). And it is here that the Provider can lie, since
the probabilities, p, are only known to the Provider.
An untrustworthy Provider can create a fake vector of
probabilities, pˆ, that implicates Buyer j. However, the dis-
tribution, f(p), is publicly known, so the question becomes,
can the Provider generate a pˆ that (i) implicates Buyer j, and
(ii) has an arbitrarily high probability of been drawn from the
distribution f(p)?
It is indeed extremely simple to do so. Let us focus on
a column where pi = p and Yi = Xj,i. The true summand
in Eq. (1) is g(1, 1, p) or g(0, 0, p) (with equal probability).
Suppose that the content provider replaces the secret value p
by a fake secret pˆ which is drawn independently according to
f . On average, this summand takes the new value:
∆(t) =
∫ 1−t
t
f(pˆ)
g(1, 1, pˆ) + g(0, 0, pˆ)
2
dpˆ =
1
π
ln
1− t
t
.
For a cutoff t = 1/900 (recommended by G. Tardos to fight
against 3 colluders), the numerical value is surprisingly high:
∆(1/900) ≈ 2.16. Suppose now that the content provider
applies the same strategy on an index i where Yi 6= Xj,i.
Then the expectation is the opposite. However, in a Tardos
code, even for an innocent Buyer j, the proportion α of in-
dices where symbols Yi and Xj,i agree is above 1/2 for most
of the collusion strategy. For instance, with an interleaving
collusion attack, α = 3/4 whatever the collusion size c.
Based on this knowledge, we propose the following at-
tack. The Provider computes the score for all Buyers, which,
on average, equals 0 for innocent Buyers and 2m/cπ for the
colluders [4]. The provider initializes pˆ = p. Then, he/she
randomly selects a column i and randomly draws a fake secret
pˆi ∼ f . He/She re-computes the score of Buyer j with this
fake secret and iterates selecting a different column until Sj
is above the threshold Z . On average, m(cπ∆(α − 1/2))−1
secret values pi need to be changed in this way, e.g. only
20% of the code length if the copy has been made using an
interleaving attack.
Fig. 1 illustrates this attack for the case where the code
length is m = 1000 and the number of colluders is c = 3.
The solid coloured lines depict the accusation scores of 10
randomly selected innocent buyers. We observe that after be-
tween 20-30% of the elements of p have been altered, the
accusation scores of the innocent Buyers exceed the origi-
nal scores of the colluders. In fact, the colluders accusation
scores also increase. However, we are not concerned with the
highest score, but rather with any score exceeding the thresh-
old. Thus, it is sufficient to raise the score of the innocent
Buyer, even if this raises all other Buyers’ scores as well.
Fig. 1. Accusation score as a function of the number of
changed elements of the vector p for the case where m =
1000 and c = 3. The solid coloured lines show how the ac-
cusation score of 10 randomly selected innocent buyers in-
creases as more of the elements are modified. The dotted hor-
izontal lines show the original scores for the colluders before
the modification.
Randomly selecting some pi’s (independently from Xj
and Y) and re-drawing them according to the same law en-
sures that pˆi ∼ f , ∀i. Therefore, a judge observing pˆ cannot
distinguish the forgery. For this reason, the judge might re-
quest to see the matrix X to statistically test whether the ele-
ments of X are drawn from the distribution pˆ. In this case, the
Provider can give a fake matrix Xˆ where the columns whose
pi have been modified are re-drawn such that P(Xki = 1) =
pˆi, ∀k 6= j. The only way to prevent this deception would
be if the judge asked an innocent User k 6= j for his copy in
order to verify the authenticity of Xˆ. This latter step seems
somewhat odd.
4. AN ASYMMETRIC TARDOS CODE
CONSTRUCTION
In previous asymmetric fingerprinting schemes, it is up to the
Buyer to generate his or her fingerprint. The Buyer then sends
a commitment to the Provider, which prevents the Buyer from
changing the fingerprint during the protocol. Unfortunately,
this cannot be done with a Tardos code since the fingerprint
must follow a given statistical distribution controlled by p,
and p is only known to the Provider. This section proposes
a solution to this problem, which consists of two phases. We
first review its main building blocks.
4.1. Building blocks
There are two key building blocks to the proposed protocol.
The first is a block involving encryption primitives, while the
second involves double-blind random selection.
4.1.1. Encryption Primitives
We need two cryptographic primitives: a regular symmetric
cryptosystem E (e.g. AES) and a commutative encryption
scheme CE (e.g. in [5, 6]). This latter primitive has the fol-
lowing property. For every key k1 and k2, and for every mes-
sage m, ciphering twice with k1 and then k2, or k2 and then
k1 leads to the same result:
CE(k1,CE(k2,m)) = CE(k2,CE(k1,m)). (2)
4.1.2. Pick a card, any card!
Here we introduce a double-blind random selection protocol
between two entities A and B, based on [5]. Let {Ok}Nk=1 be
a list of N objects offered by entity A. We now explain how
entity B selects an item from this list without actually seeing
the list and entity A does not know which item entity B picked.
Entity A chooses N secret keys for the E cryptosys-
tem called {Kk}Nk=1 and computes the cipher texts Ck =
E(Kk, Ok). Entity A also chooses a secret key S for the
CE cryptosystem and encrypts the previous keys such that
Dk = CE(S,Kk). He sends B the lists C = {Ck}Nk=1 and
D = {Dk}
N
k=1. Entity B chooses an index k ∈ [N ] (with the
notation [N ] = {1, . . . , N}), a secret key R for the CE cryp-
tosystem, and sends A the cipher Uk = CE(R,Dk). Entity
A decrypts U with his key S and sends B the result. Thanks
to the commutative property, this message indeed equals
CE(R,Kk), which B is able to decrypt thanks to his/her key
R. The result is the key Kk which deciphers Ck onto the
object Ok .
4.2. Phase 1: Generation of the fingerprint
We use the above protocolm times to generate the fingerprint
of the j-th Buyer Xj = (Xj,1, . . . , Xj,m). In this generation
phase, A is the Provider, and B is Buyer j. The Provider gener-
ates a secret vector p for a Tardos code. Each pi is quantized
such that pi = Li/N with Li ∈ [N − 1].
For a given index i, the objects are the concatenation of a
binary symbol and a text string. There are only two versions
of an object in list Ci. For Li objects, Ok,i = (1‖ref1,i), and
Ok,i = (0‖ref0,i) for the N − Li remaining ones. The use
of the text strings {refX,i} depends on the content distribu-
tion mode as detailed in Sec. 5.1. The objectOk,i is encrypted
with keyKk,i and stored in the list Ci = {Ck,i}Nk=1. There are
thus as many different lists Ci as the length m of the finger-
print. These lists are published in a public Write Once Read
Many (WORM) directory [7] whose access is granted to all
chooses k(j, i)
Uk(j,i),i = CE(Rj,i, Dj,i,k(j,i))
Dj,i
Uk(j,i),i
V = CE−1(Sj , Uk(j,i),i)Vpij(k)‖Kpij (k),i = CE
−1(Rj,i, V )
Cpij(k),i
Dj,i,k = CE(Sj , (pij(k)‖Kpij (k),i))
Cpij(k),i = E(Kpij(k),i, Opij(k),i)Opij(k),i = E
−1(Kpij (k),i, Cpij(k),i)
WORM
B P
Fig. 2. Generation of a fingerprint bit.
users. As explicitly stated in its name, nobody can modify or
erase what has been put the first time in a WORM directory;
beside, anybody can check its integrity.
On the contrary, the D-lists are made specific to a given
Buyer j. The provider picks a secret key Sj and a permutation
πj(.) over [N ]. This Buyer is proposed a list Dj,i of N items
as Dj,i,k = CE(Sj , (πj(k)‖Kπj(k),i)). Therefore, the lists Ci
are common for all users, whereas the lists Dj,i are specific to
Buyer j. We have introduced here a slight change wrt to pro-
tocol 4.1.2, i.e. the permutation πj whose role is explained
below. Buyer j chooses a secret Rj,i and one object in the
list, say the k(j, i)-th object. He/she sends the corresponding
ciphertext Uk(j,i),i = CE(Rj,i, Dj,i,k(j,i)) decrypted by the
provider with Sj and sent back to the Buyer who, at the end,
gets the index ind(j, i) = πj(k(j, i)) and the key Kind(j,i),i,
which grants him/her the access to the object Oind(j,i),i, store
encrypted in the WORM. It contains the symbol bind(j,i),i.
This will be the value of the i-th bit of his/her fingerprint,
Xj,i = bind(i,j),i, which equals ‘1’ with probability pi.
The provider keeps in a log file the values of Sj and
Uk(j,i),i, the user keeps Rj,i in his/her records.
4.3. Phase 2: Disclosure of the halfword
For a more practical accusation process (see Sec. 5.2), the
Provider will order Buyer j to reveal mh < m bits of his fin-
gerprint (phase 1 has been completed). This is done in order
to build the so-called halfword [3] allowing the Provider to
list a bunch of suspected users to be forwarded to the judge
(See Sec. 5.2). The following facts must be enforced: Buyer
j doesn’t know which bits of his/her fingerprint are disclosed,
and the Provider asks for the same bit indices to all the users.
Again, we propose to use the double-blind random se-
lection protocol of Sec. 4.1.2. Now, Buyer j plays the role
of A, and the Provider the role of B, N = m, and object
Oi = (Ri,j‖aleai,j). These items are the m secret keys se-
lected by Buyer j during Sec. 4.2 concatenated with random
strings aleai,j to be created by Buyer j. This alea finds its
use during the personalization of the content (see Sec. 5.1).
Following the protocol, the Provider selects mh such object.
The decryption of message Uk(i,j),j received during the con-
struction phase of Sec. 4.2 thanks to the disclosure of the key
Ri,j yields Di,j,k(i,j) which in turn decrypted with key Sj
provides the index of the selected object, otherwise the proto-
col stops. This prevents a colluder from denying the symbol
of his fingerprint and from copying the symbol of an accom-
plice. At the end, the Provider learns which item was picked
by Buyer j at index i. Therefore, he/she ends up with mh
couples (Xj,i, aleak(i,j),i) associated to a given Buyer j.
Thanks to this second part of our protocol, the Provider
discloses mh bits of the fingerprints without revealing any
knowledge about the others, and Buyer j doesn’t know which
bits of his fingerprint were disclosed even if the Provider al-
ways chooses the same indices from a user to another. Of
course, Buyer j refuses to follow this part of the protocol for
more than mh objects.
5. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
At this point, we have both introduced a new attack and a new
asymmetric fingerprinting algorithm that are both specific to
Tardos codes. The astute reader will be aware the our asym-
metric fingerprinting protocol does not constitute a complete
system. Here we briefly touch up on other implementation
issues.
5.1. Watermarking
First, we need an algorithm so that the Provider sends the
Buyer a copy of the Work with his/her fingerprint embedded,
given the Provider does not know this fingerprint. There ex-
ist buyer-seller protocols for embedding a sequence Xj into
a content co without disclosing Xj to the seller and co to the
buyer. They are based on homomorphic encryption scheme
and work with some specific implementations of spread spec-
trum [8] or Quantization Index Modulation watermarking [9].
The reader is directed to [8, 9] for further details. These meth-
ods can be adapted to embed the Tardos codes, but due to
space limitations, a brief sketch of the adaptation of [9] is
presented hereafter.
We adapt the secure embedding proposed in the last cited
work as follows. Let c(0)i = (c
(0)
i,1 , . . . , c
(0)
i,Q) be the Q quan-
tized components (like pixels, DCT coefficients, portion of
streams etc) of the i-th content block watermarked with sym-
bol ‘0’ (resp. c(1)i with symbol ‘1’). Denote di = c(1)i − c(0)i .
Assume as in [9, Sect. 5], an additive homomorphic and
probabilistic encryptionE[.] such as the Pallier cryptosystem.
Buyer j has a pair of public/private keys (pkj , skj) and sends
(Epkj [Xj,1], . . . , Epkj [Xj,m]). The provider sends him/her
the ciphers
Epkj [c
(0)
i,ℓ ].Epkj [Xj,i]
di,ℓ , ∀(i, ℓ) ∈ [m]× [Q].
Thanks to the homomorphism, Buyer j decrypts this with skj
into c(0)i,ℓ if Xj,i = 0, c
(1)
i,ℓ if Xj,i = 1. Since Xj,i is constant
for the Q components of the i-th block, a lot of bandwidth
and computer power will be saved with a composite signal
representation as detailed in [9, Sect. 3.2.2].
A crucial step in these buyer-seller protocols is to prove
to the seller that what is sent by the Buyer is indeed the en-
cryption of bits, and moreover bits of the Buyer’s fingerprint.
To do so usually involves complex zero-knowledge subpro-
tocols [8, 9]. We believe we can avoid this complexity by
taking advantage of the fact that the Provider already knows
some bits of the fingerprint Xj , i.e. those belonging to the
halfword (see Sect. 4.3), and the Buyers do not know the in-
dices of these bits. Therefore, in mv random indices of the
halfword, the Provider asks the Buyer j to open his/her com-
mitment. For one such index iv, Buyer j reveals the random
value riv of the probabilistic Pallier encryption (with the nota-
tion of [9]). The Provider computes gXj,ivhriv mod N and
verifies it equals the iv-th cipher, which Buyer j pretended to
be Epkj [Xj,i].
One drawback of this simple verification scheme is that
the Buyer discovers mv indices of the halfword. This may
give rise to more elaborated collusion attacks. For example,
Buyer j, as a colluder, could try to enforce Yiv 6= Xj,iv when
attempting to forge a pirated copy. Further discussion of this
is beyond the scope of this paper.
This approach may also introduce a threat to the Buyer.
An untrustworthy Provider can ask to open the commitments
of non-halfword bits in order to disclose bits he/she is not
supposed to know. For this reason, the Provider needs to
send aleak(iv ,j),iv as defined in Sec. 4.3 to show Buyer j
that his/her verification occurs on a halfword bit.
5.2. The accusation procedure
When an unauthorized copy is found, the Provider decodes
the watermark and extracts the sequence Y from the pirated
content. The Provider computes the halfscores by applying
Eq. (1) only on the halfwords. This produces a list of suspects,
e.g. those users whose score is above a threshold, or those
users with the highest scores.
Of course, this list cannot be trusted, since the Provider
may be untrustworthy. The list is therefore sent to a third
party, referred to as the Judge, who first verifies the com-
putation of the halfscores. If different values are found, the
Provider is black-listed. Otherwise, the Judge computes the
scores of the full fingerprint.
To do so, the Judge needs the secret p: he/she asks the
Provider for the keys {Kk,i}, ∀(k, i) ∈ [N ]× [m] and thereby
obtains from the WORM all the objects {Ok,i}, and there-
fore the true values of (p1, . . . , pm). The Judge must also re-
quest suspected Buyer j for the keys Rj,i in order to decrypt
the messages Uk(j,i),i in Di,j,k(i,j) which reveal which object
Buyer j picked during the i-th round of Sec. 4.2 and whence
Xj,i. Finally, the Judge accuses the user whose score over the
full length fingerprint is above a given threshold (related to a
probability of false alarm).
5.3. Security
Suppose first that the Provider is honest and denote by c the
collusion size. A reliable tracing capability on the halfwords
is needed to avoid false alarms. Therefore, as proven by G.
Tardos, mh = O(c2 lognǫ−1), where ǫ is the probability of
suspecting some innocent Buyers. Moreover, successful col-
lusions are avoided if there are secret values such that pi <
c−1 or pi > 1 − c
−1(see [10]). Therefore, N should be suf-
ficiently big, around a hundred, to resist against collusion of
size of the order of ten. During the generation of the finger-
print in Sec. 4.2, permutation πj(.) makes sure that Buyer j
randomly picks up a bit ‘1’ with probability pi = Li/N as
needed in the Tardos code. In particular, a colluder cannot
benefit from the discoveries made by his accomplices.
We now analyze why colluders would cheat during the
watermarking of their version of the Work described in
Sec. 5.1. By comparing their fingerprints, they see indices
where they all have the same symbols, be it ‘0’ or ‘1’. As
explained in the introduction, they won’t be able to alter those
bits in the tampered fingerprint except if they cheat during the
watermarking: If their fingerprint bits at index i all equal ‘1’,
one of them must pretend he/she has a ‘0’ in this position. If
they succeed to do so for all these positions, they will able to
forge a pirated copy with a null fingerprint for instance.
How many times do the colluders need to cheat? With
probability pci (resp. (1−pi)c), they all have bit ‘1’ (resp. ‘0’)
at index i. Thus, there are on average mc(c) = m
∫ 1−t
t (p
c +
(1 − p)c)f(p)dp such indices. The Provider asks for a bit
verification with probability mv/mh. The probability of a
successful attack for a collusion of size c is therefore (1 −
mv/mh)
mc(c)
. Our numerical simulations have shown that
mv shouldn’t be more than 50 bits for typical code length and
collusion size below a hundred. Thus, mv is well below mh.
Suppose now that the Provider is dishonest. The fact that
the m lists Ci, ∀i ∈ [m] are public and not modifiable pre-
vents the Provider from altering them for a specific Buyer in
order to frame him/her afterwards. Moreover, it will raise
the Judge’s suspicion if the empirical distribution of the pi
is not close to the pdf f . Yet, biases can be introduced on
the probabilities for the symbols of the colluders’ fingerprint
only if there is a coalition between them and the untrustwor-
thy Provider. For instance, the Provider can choose a per-
mutation such that by selecting the first item (resp. the last
one) in the list Dj,i an accomplice colluder is sure to pick
up a symbol ‘1’ (resp. ‘0’). This ruins the tracing property
of the code, but this does not allow the Provider to frame an
innocent. First, it is guaranteed that p used in Eq. 1 is the
one which generated the code. Second, the Provider and his
accomplices colluders must ignore a significant part of the
fingerprints of innocent Buyers. To this end, m − mh must
also be in order of O(c2 lognǫ−1). If this holds, the Judge
is able to take a reliable decision while discarding the half-
word part of the fingerprint. Consequently, m ≈ 2mh, our
protocol has doubled the typical code length, which is still in
O(c2 log nǫ−1).
6. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Tardos codes are currently the state-of-the-art in collusion-
resistant fingerprinting. However, the previous asymmetric
fingerprint protocols cannot be applied to this particular con-
struction. There are mainly two difficulties. First, the Buyer
has to generate his/her secret fingerprint but according to vec-
tor p, which is kept secret by the Provider. Second, the vector
p used in the accusation process must be the same as the one
which generated the fingerprints.
We have proposed a new asymmetric fingerprinting pro-
tocol dedicated to Tardos codes. We believe that this is the
first such protocol, and that it is practically efficient.
The construction of the fingerprints and their embedding
within pieces of Work do not need a trusted third party.
Note, however, that during the accusation stage, a trusted
third party is necessary like in any asymmetric fingerprinting
scheme we are aware of. Further work is needed to determine
if such a third-party can be eliminated. In particular, we an-
ticipate that some form of secure multi-party computation can
be applied.
Other extensions to this work include (i) non-binary Tar-
dos codes, and (ii) implementation on compliant consumer
devices such as Blu-Ray players. We also plan to develop this
as part of future work.
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